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Abstract
　The pagoda-based health equity fund (HEF) in Kirivong Health Operational District is a scheme 
to exempt poor people from user-fees using funds raised from the local people, especially non-
beneficiaries of HEF (NBs). This paper is intended to examine how NBs are motivated to make a 
donation and with what motives they could be expected to make larger donations.
　Analysis of field data indicate that, because HEF management committees, based on Buddhist 
temple, solicit for voluntary donation in a way linked to Buddhism, most NBs regard the contribution 
to the HEF as an act of merit making. Consequently, altruism for poor people and merit making 
based on it are their major motives of donation. However, NBs tend to make a smaller donation 
when they have altruistic motives than when they have non-altruistic motives such as an insurance 
motive or when they make a donation on the basis of mutual help.
　The findings of this study underscore the potential role of religious organizations in raising funds 
for health care for poor people. Another lesson is that having non-poor people regard their 
contribution as an act of mutual support is expected to be effective to induce them to support the 
fundraising.
Ⅰ　Introduction
　From the standpoint of improving the quality of healthcare and allocating funds to underfinanced 
sectors of healthcare, introduction of user fees at public health institutions was advocated (Akin et 
al., 1987). Some governments of developing countries followed that recommendation. However, the 
introduction of user fees is reported to have obstructed poor people's access to medical services in 
some countries (McPake, 1993; James et al., 2006). To insure poor people's access to healthcare, some 
governments exempt poor people from user-fees. Although this policy is not always effective (brief 
review by James et al., 2006), the Cambodian case is regarded as a successful case. To reduce 
possible negative impacts of user-fees on poor people (Jacobs and Price, 2004), the Cambodian 
government introduced Health Equity Funds (HEF), a system of compensating public medical 
facilities for their free medical services to poor people. Several studies have revealed that the HEF 
succeeds in improving poor people's access to medical services and reducing the burden of their 
medical expenses (Flores et al., 2011; Jacobs et al., 2007; Noirhomme et al., 2007).
　An unsolved problem of the HEF is how to raise funds. At present, the Cambodian government 
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must rely on financial assistance by international donors for the HEF (Ministry of Health, 2011). To 
extend the scale of the program and to assure its sustainability, funds should also be collected 
domestically. In this regard, the program in Kirivong Health Operational District (Kirivong OD)1) 
deserves attention. In Kirivong OD, Takeo province, the HEF at the health center (HC) level is 
funded by donations from the local population without financial support from outside. As HEF 
management committees (HEFMC),2) the committees in charge of raising and managing the funds, 
are closely connected with the pagoda committee of Buddhist temples (vat), a previous study called 
this system “pagoda-managed HEF” (Jacobs et al., 2007).
　To introduce similar schemes in other regions of Cambodia and to construct schemes to collect 
funds from the general public for healthcare services in other countries, a lot can be learned from 
the case of the pagoda-managed HEF.
　To the author's knowledge, no similar scheme exists in other countries. Only Jacobs et al. (2007) 
analyze the pagoda-based HEF in detail. They emphasize the organizational capacity and the 
organizational viability of HEFMCs. Regarding the issue of fundraising, the study describes how 
funds are raised and presents the financial situations of the pagoda-based HEF. The study, however, 
insufficiently addresses another important question: how non-beneficiaries of the HEF (NB), non-
poor people by definition, are motivated to contribute funds to the HEF from which they do not 
receive benefits.
　In this regard, it is worth noting that in Takeo province many villages have a fundraising practice 
called sangkeaha to give financial assistance to those who suffer from serious illness. Sangkeaha is 
similar to fundraising for the HEF in the sense that in both practices villagers are asked to make 
donations to help their fellow villagers. The two practices are also similar in that people's faith in 
Buddhism underlies people's participation in the fundraising. Because of these similarities, the study 
on sangkeaha (Yagura, 2013) can provide clues to the understanding of fundraising for the HEF.
　But sangkeaha differs from fundraising for the HEF in that in the former basically any villagers, 
regardless of their economic status, can become a beneficiary (i.e. one who receives donations) once 
they get seriously ill. This means that, unlike fundraising for the HEF, sangkeaha is a system of 
mutual help like insurance (Yagura, 2013). People also take this point into consideration when they 
make donations in sangkeaha (Yagura, 2013). The significant difference as such between the two 
practices warrants a study specific to fundraising for the HEF. In fact, as demonstrated in the later 
sections of this paper, we find dissimilarity in people's motive of donation between sangkeaha and 
fundraising for the HEF.
　As discussed in the next section, the motive of donation is guided by the way in which the 
fundraising is arranged. The latter is determined by characteristics of the organization that designs 
the fundraising methods. However, as is also argued in the next section, how much NBs donate is 
expected to be affected by their motives to donate. This suggests that we can collect more funds 
from people by properly designing fundraising methods.
　Based on these arguments, this study examines three questions related to the pagoda-based HEF: 
(1) what motivates NBs make a donation for the HEF; (2) what elements of the fundraising 
methods and the characteristics of HEFMC educe NBs' motives; and (3) what relation exist between 
the type of the donation motive and the donation amount that people make. To address these 
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questions, this study uses data collected mainly from HEFMCs and through a household survey 
conducted in Kirivong OD.
　Although this study addresses only the case of Kirivong OD, the findings are expected to provide 
hints for designing community-based financing schemes for poor people because no other case of 
such a scheme has been reported in the relevant literature.
　This paper is organized as follows. The analytical framework is presented in the next section. 
After outlining fundraising methods and the financial record of pagoda-based HEF, people's motives 
to contribute funds to the HEF are examined by linking it to the way in which the fundraising is 
organized and the characteristics of the HEFMC. Then, the relation between the donation motives 
and the donation amount is examined statistically. The final section summarizes the findings of this 
study and presents policy implications derived from them.
Ⅱ　Analytical Framework
　The special feature of the pagoda-based HEF as a health financing scheme is that funds are raised 
from those who do not receive benefits directly from it. Apparently, non-poor people are asked to 
help poor people unilaterally. Therefore, in terms of the issue of the motive or incentive of those who 
make a financial contribution, conventional theories of health financing such as that of health 
insurance are inapplicable to the pagoda-based HEF. Rather, we must employ theories on giving in 
general, which explain why people give to others, as elaborated in arguments by Kolm (2006).
　In addition, for designing effective schemes to raise funds for healthcare, we must relate people's 
motive (or incentive) to a way in which funds are raised. People's motives to donate are expected to 
differ according to the way in which fundraising is organized even given identical purposes of 
fundraising. To elucidate this argument, we discuss possible motives to donate (give) to others and 
situations in which motives are likely to be induced in the context of fundraising for the HEF. The 
theoretical arguments on motives to give to others presented below also serve as the basis of an 
analytical framework for examining people's motive to make donations in sangkeaha (Yagura, 2013). 
　Following Kolm (2006), motives to give to others are classified largely into altruistic motives and 
non-altruistic motives. In the former, a pursuit of the benefit of the recipient motivates the donor, 
although it does not in the latter.
　Altruistic motives are based largely on hedonic altruism or normative altruism. For people with 
hedonic altruism, the improvement of the welfare of the recipient makes them happy. This motive is 
expected to be induced in a setting where donors can recognize that their donation actually 
engenders the improvement of recipients' circumstances. People give to others out of normative 
altruism when they find normative values in helping others. This motive is expected to be induced 
by giving the impression that a donation has such value.
　One non-altruistic motive is the avoidance of sanction (on those who fail to donate), which is 
aroused by introducing a penalty for non-participation in donation. Another non-altruistic motive is 
a pursuit of social prestige given to donors. For this motive to be effective, who made donations, and 
how much, should be made public.
　Reciprocity, or the “insurance motive” based on it, is a motive which can be regarded both as 
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altruistic and non-altruistic. This motive explains cases in which a person D makes a donation to R 
to return the favor R gave to D in the past, or in which D expects to receive help from R in return 
when D has a difficulty in future. In the latter case, the motive of D can be regarded as an 
“insurance motive” because the purpose is to prepare for future risks. People can be expected to be 
more likely to have such motives when the identities of donors and recipients are made public: a 
situation in which donors and recipients can recognize the relations of dyadic reciprocity between 
them.
　Even when the relations of dyadic reciprocity are not established between donors and recipients, 
people might be conscious of general reciprocity (Kolm, 2008) when making a donation. In 
communities where people help each other on a daily basis, one can feel sure that other people can 
be expected to help a person who falls into a difficult situation. Therefore, she might think she 
should lend help to other people too even if she cannot expect to receive a favor directly from the 
person she helps. In a similar manner, in the context of the HEF, NBs might think they should 
contribute to the HEF because they would also be helped by other people through the HEF if they 
were to become poor later.
　There are expected to be more motives than those described above, but a person can have 
different motives at one time.
　The next question is how the donation motives are related to the donation amount. We cannot 
assume that a specific motive affects the donation amount in a fixed direction. Those who are 
extremely altruistic can make a large donation only with their altruistic motive. However, we can 
yet anticipate that people are likely to make a larger donation when their donation engenders their 
own benefit in some way, or the motive includes a selfish element. Among the motives described 
above, the pursuit of social prestige and the insurance motive are such motives.
　As discussed above, fundraising is arranged to determine the outcome of the fundraising by 
influencing people's motives to donate, which would then affect how much they donate. The 
fundraising method is determined by the characteristics of the fundraising managing body, which is 
expected to adopt methods to which the experience and the skill of its members are applicable or 
which are in accordance with their value judgment. For Kirivong OD, as explained later, HEFMCs 
mainly comprise members of pagoda committees, which execute the financial management of 
Buddhist temples. Given this background, a previous report argues that HEFMCs succeed in a 
transparent financial management (Jacobs et al., 2007). However, the fact that HEFMCs are based on 
pagoda committees can also make a great difference in fundraising by directing the way in which 
the fundraising is arranged.
　The relations between the fundraising method, the characteristics of the managing body 
determining it, and people's motive to donate can be presented as Fig. 1. The managing body 
hypothetically adopts fundraising methods that are tailored to their ability and values. The methods 
of fundraising set up as such, in combination with people's economic situation and value judgment, 
are expected to provide people with motives to donate. Therefore, they affect whether and how 
much people donate. In the following sections, we examine the respective components in this order.
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Ⅲ　Pagoda-based HEF in Kirivong OD
１．Field survey
　The data used for this study were collected through a field survey conducted in September 2010 
and during February-March in 2011 by a research team including the author. We collected data 
from three sources. First, general information related to HCs and HEFMCs was collected from 
Buddhism for Health (BFH), a local NGO based in Kirivong, which supports HEFMCs and manages 
the HEF at the hospital level. Second, five HCs and their affiliated HEFMCs (A, B, C, D, E) were 
selected. Subsequently, HEFMC representatives were interviewed to obtain detailed information 
related to their activities. Two of the five HCs were selected from Kirivong district because the 
district has the largest number of HCs in Kirivong OD. Each of other three HCs was selected from 
the other three districts that constitute the OD.
　Third, to collect information related to local people's contribution to the HEF, a survey was 
administered for 200 households in five villages, each of which is within the catchment area of one of 
the five HCs3) selected for this study. From each village 35 NB households (=non-poor households) 
and five HEF beneficiary (EFB) households (=poor households) were selected randomly. Although 
information related to EFBs was collected, only NBs data are used for this study because their 
motive of contributing to the HEF is the subject of this study.
　 Three of the five surveyed villages also have sangkeaha, through which funds are raised from 
villagers to help those who get seriously ill.4)
２．HEF in Kirivong OD
　Kirivong OD consists of the entire area of three districts (Kirivong, Koh Andaet, and Borey 
Cholsar), which include 23 communes in total, and a part of Treang district (including seven 
communes).5) These are rural districts where most households engage in rice farming. The OD has 
Fig 1. Analytical framework 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
Characteristics of HEFMC
Methods of Fundraising
Motives to donate People’s Values  
& Financial Capacity 
(Amount of) Donation
Fig. 1. Analytical fram rk
Source: Prepar y the author.
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20 HCs and one referral hospital. The population in the OD as of 2010 was 229,475, of which 32,254 
people (6,968 households), or 14.05% of the entire population, were EFBs.
　Starting in 2003, in Kirivong OD, the HEF scheme was applied to medical services at both the 
referral hospital and HCs in the OD. EFBs are eligible to receive medical services at these public 
facilities for no charge. The HEF also covers their transportation costs to these facilities.
　The HEF is funded at the hospital level by the Cambodian government (with financial assistance 
from foreign donors). It is managed by BFH. The HEF at the HC level is managed by the HEFMC 
established at each HC level. The funds are raised by the respective HEFMCs from the local 
population in the catchment area of the HC. Although HEFMCs have received regular technical 
assistance from BFH and although they had received seed money from a foreign donor in 2003, no 
financial support from outside has been provided since then.
　BFH also introduces the HEF scheme based on locally collected funds such as the one in Kirivong 
OD in other ODs (in Ang Roka OD in 2006, in Kampot OD in 2009 and in Bati and Preah Sihanouk 
ODs in 2010).
３．HEFMC
　The HEFMC members are selected fundamentally from vats and villages within the catchment 
area of the affiliated HC. Among vats in the HC catchment area, one vat is designated as the vat kool, 
which functions as the executive center of HEFMC. The chairman of the committee is selected from 
the vat kool.
　The number of committee members and its composition differ from committee to committee. 
Table 1 presents cases of five HEFMCs surveyed. It is readily apparent that most members are 
selected from vats. Those who are selected from vats include the lay members of the pagoda 
committee of respective vat as well as non-members of the pagoda committee but working for the 
management of vat. Achars, or lay persons arranging ceremonies related to Buddhism, are among 
them.
　The members of HEFMCs are unpaid. Although they had received a transportation allowance 
Table 1. HEFMCs surveyed
Catchment area Number of
committee
member
Member
HC
Number of
village
Number of
vat
A 19 8 24 The chief monk & 2 achar vat from each vat
B 21 10 20 2 persons from each  vat
C 17 6 46
2 persons from each vat + 2 persons from 
each village a)
D 8 4 9
2 persons from each vat b) + 1 vice village 
chief from one of the 8 villages
E 15 4 8 2 persons from each  vat
Source: Prepared by the author based on information collected by the author from each HEFMC.
a) Villagers other than village chief.
b) Including one Islamic mosque (for other HCs no Islamic mosque exists in their catchment areas).
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from BFH in the past, no allowance was provided in 2010.
　The committee members are expected to fulfill three tasks. They raise funds for the HEF and 
make payments to the HC. They also identify EFB, or poor households eligible to receive the HEF 
benefit. This work is done in collaboration with village chiefs of each village.6) Moreover, they convey 
requests from the local people to the HC to improve the service at the HC.
Ⅳ　Fundraising Methods and Financial Records
１．Fundraising methods
　Each HEFMC determines its method of fundraising for the HEF, but common methods are 
adopted presumably because of advice from BFH and the exchange of ideas among committees. 
Fundraising methods adopted in 2010 by the five HEFMCs surveyed are as described below.
1) Bon phkar
　All five HEFMCs collected funds through bon phkar, a traditional fundraising ceremony in 
Cambodia for public purposes such as construction of vat and school buildings. Each of the five 
HEFMCs organized bon phkar dedicated for the HEF one time in 2010 in vats or villages. People 
participate in bon phkar to make a donation on a voluntary basis.
2) Donation box
　Donation boxes dedicated for the HEF are placed at vats or commune offices to collect donations 
from visitors. All five HEFMCs put donation boxes at vats. Three of them also place the donation 
boxes at commune offices. Donation boxes at vats collect contributions from people especially when 
religious events are held at vats, such as phchum ben, kathem and thngai sel7) as well as New Year 
festival. Visitors decide independently whether to put money in a donation box. In fact, little donation 
was collected through the donation box at commune offices. For this reason one HEFMC stopped 
placing a donation box at the commune office in 2010.
3) Contributions from vats
　All five HEFMCs ask each vat (and one Islamic mosque in the case of one HEFMC) in their 
catchment area to contribute a set amount of funds to the HEF annually from their budgets. This 
was started as early as in 2009, presumably in response to a funding shortage. Each vat has its own 
funds, which are also donated from local people (and sometimes from affluent people from other 
areas), for vat operations and vat building construction. In the respective cases of B, D, and 
E-HEFMCs, each vat in the catchment area was asked to donate 500,000 riels every year. The 
A-HEFMC area vats are asked for 300,000－500,000 riels annually (information related to E-HEFMC 
was unavailable). However, according to financial records provided by these HEFMCs, only one vat 
contributed money up to the requested amount in 2010, probably because vats are also not 
sufficiently affluent to provide this level of contribution.
4) Donation from private ceremonies
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　Three HEFMCs also ask guests of private ceremonies (such as life cycle events) in villages to 
make donations to the HEF.
２．Payment to the HC
　Using funds collected through these methods, each HEFMC pays to its affiliated HC the lost 
revenue of the HC because of user-fee exemption for EFBs. To receive the payment, the HC reports 
detailed data every month to the HEFMC related to the cases of the EFBs using services at the HC. 
After validating the information provided by the HC, the HEFMC reimburses the HC according to 
the report.
　The money collected by a HEFMC is used only for payment to its affiliated HC; the funds are not 
sent to other HCs. In other words, each HEFMC cannot count on (the money collected by) other 
HEFMCs if it cannot collect sufficient funds to pay the HC. Because of this “self-support system,” 
for some HEFMCs, the amount of money they collected is short of the user-fees for the EFBs, as 
described later. In such a case, the HEFMC owes funds to the HC until it can collect sufficient funds 
to “repay” the debt.
３．Financial status of HEFMCs
　Fig. 2 presents the total annual amount of funds collected by the 20 HEFMCs in Kirivong OD. 
After a steady increase to 2005, the collected funds dropped abruptly. However, the amount collected 
began to increase in 2009 again and hit a record-high level in 2010. The increase since 2009 is 
attributable to the introduction of contributions from vats. The introduction of this new funding 
source was a response to the abrupt drop up to 2008.
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Source: Prepared by the author based on data provided from BFH.
Notes: Fund raising in 2003 was started from May.
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Notes: Fund raising in 2003 was started from May.
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　Table 2 shows HEF revenue (the amount collected by HEFMC) and the HEF expenses (user fees 
for the EFBs exempted by the HCs), as well as their mutual differences. As the table shows, 
HEFMCs succeed overall in collecting sufficient funds. In total, 52.7 million riels were collected by 
the 20 HEFMCs in 2010. The figures differ from those shown in Fig. 2 because different data sources 
were used. This figure amounted to 1,632 riels per EFB (person) and 267 riels per NB. In contrast, 
the HEF expense at the 20 HCs during the same year was 37.3 million riels, leaving a surplus of 15.4 
million riels.
　However, because of the “self-support system” described above, the financial performance varies 
greatly by HEFMC. Among the 20 HEFMCs, five committees recorded a negative surplus in 2010. 
Although the “best” HEFMC obtained a surplus of 5,205 riels per EFB, the “worst” HEFMC ended 
up with a deficit of 1,110 riels per EFB, or two million riels in total.
　We were unable to obtain detailed data related to the amount collected by fundraising methods, 
but available data indicate that bon phkar, the donation box, and the contribution from vats is an 
important source of funds. Regarding A-HEFMC, out of 3.23 million riels of the total amount 
collected in 2010, 1.5 million riels were contributed from vats; 0.86 million riels was collected through 
bon phkar. B-HEFMC also collected 1.0 million riels by bon phkar, which amounted to nearly half of 
the total amount collected (2.03 million riels) during 2010. For C-HEFMC, out of the 0.43 million riels 
collected during January-August 2010, 0.29 million riels were collected through donation boxes.
４．Household level data of donation
　Table 3 presents household-level data of donations made by NBs in bon phkar for HEF in 2010 
collected through our household survey in five villages. The names of the villages (A, B, C, D, E) 
correspond to the names of the associated HEFMC or HC (e.g., A-village is a village within the 
A-HC catchment area).
　The participation rate and the average donation amount vary greatly among villages. Although 
most sample households in E-village participated in bon phkar, only one-fourth joined in D-village. 
Regarding the average donation amount, the gap separating villages is more than double.8)
Table 2. Financial status of the pagda-managed HEF in 2010 (riel)
Total Best HEFMC Worst HEFMC
HEF revenue (A) 52,651,400 8,191,600 1,188,000
revenue per EFB 1,632 8,515 652
revenue per NB 267 615 143
HEF expense (B) 37,250,150 3,184,200 3,211,500
Expense per EFB 1,155 3,310 1,762
Surplus  (=A-B) 15,401,2 505,007,400 -2,023,500
Surplus per EFB 477 5,205 -1,110
Surplus per NB 78 376 -243
Source: Prepared by the author based on data provided from BFH.
Notes: “Best HEFMC” refers to the HEFMC which has the largest surplus per EFB, while 
“Worst HEFMC” refers to the one with the smallest surplus (the largest deficit)per EFB.
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　The village with the lowest participation rate, D-village, is under the “worst HEFMC” shown in 
Table 2 (the worst HEFMC is in fact D-HEFMC). However, participating households of D-village 
donated more than those in other villages on average. Therefore the financial status of the 
D-HEFMC could be improved greatly if the participation rate were increased.
　In this regard, it is important to understand the reasons for non-participation. According to our 
household survey, out of 71 households which did not participate in bon phkar in 2010, 80% cited “did 
not know bon phkar was held” as the reason, and 17% responded “Absent from the village” (and 
therefore did not know the holding of bon phkar or could not participate). Only 1% described “lack of 
money (to donate)” as the reason. Although these responses might not always express their true 
motivations, the reasons they gave indicate that they failed to participate not because they 
disapproved of fundraising for the HEF and that they could have participated in bon phkar as long as 
they were informed of the bon phkar and they had time to participate in it. This information further 
suggests that the bon phkar participation rate can be increased merely by informing people more 
extensively of the holding of bon phkar and by taking measures to make participation easier.
Ⅴ　Motives of Donation
１．Characteristics of the HEFMC and the fundraising methods
　The fundraising methods adopted by HEFMCs strongly reflect the fact the most committee 
members are people working for vats or for Buddhism. They are achars or pagoda committee 
members.
　First, they adopt fundraising methods that are linked to Buddhism or vat. Therefore, they have 
experience at arranging fundraising through those methods. For instance, bon phkar, a traditional 
fundraising method for various public causes in Cambodia, is generally linked to Buddhism and is 
therefore arranged by achars and attended by monks even when the purpose of the fundraising is 
unrelated to vats (such as building school). Merely by changing the cause, they can collect money 
from people for the HEF through bon phkar. Fundraising through the donation box is also linked to 
Buddhism or vat, not just because donation boxes are placed at vats but also because contributions 
Table 3. Participation and donation in bon phkar for HEF in 2010
Village N Participation 
rate (%)
Donation per household (riel)
Median Average
(1) (2)
A 33 69.7 2,000 5,189 3,459
B 34 41.2 2,000 2,643 1,088
C 35 54.3 2,000 2,105 1,143
D 31 25.8 2,500 3,929 887
E 35 85.7 1,000 1,603 1,374
Total 168 56.0 2,000 2,899 1,588
Source: Data collected by the author through household survey in February-March 2011.
Notes: Date for NBs. (1) refers to the average over participating households; (2) refers to the 
average over the whole sample households.
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made through the donation box are solicited especially at Buddhist ceremonies held at vats.
　Second, asking vats for a contribution to the HEF seems possible only because some members of 
HEFMCs also work on pagoda committees. This method would not be adopted if HEFMCs were 
organized without those who involved with vat management. For ordinary people, vats are rather 
what they should support financially.
　However, the linkage with vat or Buddhism might exclude the possibility of adopting fundraising 
methods that are unrelated to vat or Buddhism or which conflict with religious principles. For 
example, although regular collection of funds from local people was suggested as a fundraising 
method (Jacobs et al., 2007), this method has never been adopted, at least by the five HEFMCs we 
surveyed, although it can be expected to bring them a steady flow of revenue. Methods involving 
some sort of coercion might not be among the alternatives for HEFMC members working also for a 
vat, a place devoted to religious faith, which is voluntary in nature.
２．Motives to donate induced by fundraising methods
　Next, we examine whether the HEFMC fundraising methods have such elements that induce the 
motives of donation described above. As discussed below, we detect the element of normative 
altruism but cannot find those of hedonic altruism, reciprocity, the avoidance of sanction and the 
pursuit of social prestige. This is in contrast with the fundraising method of sangkeaha, in which we 
also find the elements of hedonic altruism, reciprocity and insurance (Yagura, 2013).
a) Hedonic altruism
　Elements evoking hedonic altruism are not incorporated into fundraising methods. Compassion for 
EFBs is unlikely to be evoked: donors do not hand over money directly to EFBs suffering from 
illness. First, people are not informed of who the EFBs are (probably to avoid stigmatization). For 
that reason, according to our household survey, 46% of NBs can only guess who the EFBs are in 
their village or do not know them at all.
b) Normative altruism
　Fundraising through bon phkar or donation boxes placed at vats evoke a sense of normative 
altruism in the form of merit making. These fundraising methods are linked with Buddhism as 
discussed above. Therefore people would have the impression that making a donation for the HEF is 
in accordance with Buddhist teachings. This impression would engender a belief that by making a 
donation for the HEF they can make merit, to which Buddhists in Cambodia attach great 
importance.9) Furthermore, according the representatives of HEFMCs, when they call villagers for 
joining bon phkar, they emphasize not only that donations are intended to help poor people but also 
that donors can make merit. Therefore, it is not surprising if people make a donation to make merit.
c) Avoidance of sanction and the pursuit of social prestige
　Avoidance of sanction is unlikely to constitute a motive of donation because making a donation is 
voluntary. No penalty is put on non-participation in donation. People also would not make a donation 
to receive social prestige because who made a donation, and how much was donated are not made 
Community-based Fundraising for User-fee Exemption for Poor People :　The Pagoda-based Health Equity Fund in Cambodia
Page:11無断転載禁止　
48
阪南論集　社会科学編 Vol. 49 No. 1
public.
d) Reciprocity
　We cannot find elements that induce motives based on reciprocity. Dyadic reciprocal relations 
between donors and recipients are difficult to form because neither the identities of donors nor 
recipients are made public. In addition, HEFMC representatives told the author that they do not 
mention that the donation is regarded as mutual help in the community when they call villagers for 
participation in bon phkar. Furthermore, NBs are unlikely to perceive a mutual assistance relation 
with EFBs because they cannot expect to receive much help from EFBs, who are poor by definition.
３．Motives of donation cited by non-beneficiaries
　To examine people's motives to make donations, in our household survey we asked NBs who have 
participated in bon phkar (N=105) why they made a donation to bon phkar (multiple answered were 
allowed). The results are presented in Table 4.
　The most cited reason is “to help poor people”, indicating that NBs make a donation out of 
altruism, although it remains difficult to tell whether it is hedonic or normative. The second reason is 
“to make merit”. Such a normative-altruistic motive was cited by 62% of respondents. These two 
reasons have the same root as long as one can make merit just because they help poor people.10) In 
fact, presumably because of the way in which fundraising is organized, as described above, most NBs 
relate the contribution to the HEF to merit-making. Of NBs including both those who participated in 
bon phkar and those who have never participated (N=133), all but 5% of them answered that they 
thought they could make merit by making a donation to bon phkar for the HEF.
　Motives regarded as being based on reciprocity include “to help each other”, “otherwise people 
would not help me in future” and “so that people would help me in future”, although we cannot 
judge whether they are based on dyadic reciprocity or general reciprocity. Among these three 
reasons, the latter two can be regarded as insurance motives because the respondents expect to 
receive help when they have trouble in the future. Those who cited any of these three reasons 
constitute only a minority, or 22%, of the respondents, reflecting the fact that no element is 
incorporated into fundraising to make NBs perceive reciprocity in making a donation for the HEF, as 
Table 4. Reasons for participating in bon phkar  for HEF (%)
To help poor people 72.4
To make merit 61.9
To help each other 11.4
Otherwise people would not help me in future 8.6
Otherwise people would accuse me 2.9
So that people would help me in future 1.9
It is a custom 1.9
Other reasons 13.3
Source: Data collected by the author through household survey in 
February-March 2011.
Notes: Response by NBs (N=105). Multiplue answers are allowed.
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described above.
　As anticipated, no respondent cited a reason related to social prestige. Very few gave “otherwise 
people would accuse me”, or avoidance of sanction, as a reason.
　It is worthwhile to compare these reasons to make donations for the HEF with those for 
sangkeaha. In the household survey we asked respondents from the three villages with sangkeaha the 
reason for making donations in sangkeaha. The following three points are worth mentioning.11) First, 
no respondent cited as a reason “to help poor people”, the top reason in the case of donations for the 
HEF. This is not surprising because in sangkeaha the recipients of donations are not limited to poor 
people. Second, instead, the majority of the respondents (84%) cited reasons related to reciprocity, 
such as “we should help villagers with each other”. The consideration of reciprocity, which much 
fewer respondents expressed in the case of donations for the HEF, reflects the fact that sangkeaha 
can be regarded as a system of mutual help among villagers, in which any villagers including non-
poor people can become a recipient of donations in sangkeaha.
　Third, in contrast with the case of the HEF, merit-making is not the major reason in the case of 
sangkeaha, cited only by 31 % of the respondents. This does not mean, however, that normative 
altruism is unimportant as a motive for making donations in sangkeaha. In fact, 63 % of the 
respondents also mentioned “we should help those who suffer” as a reason. Merit-making is of a 
greater importance as a motive in making donations for the HEF supposedly because funds are 
raised through bon phkar. Perceiving bon phkar as a kind of Buddhism-related ceremony, people 
would be more conscious about merit-making when making donation for the HEF than in the case 
of sangkeaha.12)
Ⅵ　Motive and Amount of Donation
　As described in the previous section, most NBs answered that they contributed to the HEF to 
help poor people and to make merit by doing so. Such are altruistic motives. In contrast, the 
insurance motive can be regarded as a selfish motive, and only a very few respondents reported 
such a motive.
　Although inducing NBs to have altruistic motives is apparently the key to the success of the 
pagoda-based HEF in collecting funds from NBs, the fact that altruistic motives are the major 
motives can negatively affect fundraising in terms of the donation amount that each participant 
makes, as discussed above. To examine whether this is the case, this section presents analysis of the 
effect of the motives of NBs on the donation amount they made using a regression analysis with our 
household data.
　The dependent variable is the donation amount made by NBs in bon phkar for the HEF held in 
2010.
　We define four dummy explanatory variables representing motives of donation: “to help poor 
people”, “to make merit”, “to help each other” and the “insurance motive”. The first three variables 
take one if the respondent cited corresponding reasons as the reason for making a donation, and take 
zero otherwise. “Insurance motive” takes one in case the respondent cited “otherwise people would 
not help me in future” or “so that people would help me in future” as the reason, and takes zero 
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otherwise. Based on the argument in Section II, the coefficient for “insurance motive” is inferred to 
be positive; and “to help poor people” and “to make merit” are expected to have negative 
coefficients. However, the sign of “to help each other” can be either positive or negative because it 
can represent either altruistic or non-altruistic motives.
　Other explanatory variables include attributes of household head (age and the educational level), 
the composition of the household member, the size of productive asset, and village dummies 
controlling for any differences between villages. The asset size is defined as the first component of 
the principal component analysis of three variables13): the area of farmland, the number of draft 
animals, and the total monetary value of other major productive assets14) owned by the household.
　The number of household members with chronic disease as well as a dummy variable 
representing whether the household head has chronic disease are also included as explanatory 
variables. These variables are fundamentally expected to be correlated negatively with the donation 
amount by negatively affecting household disposable income (because of a greater burden of medical 
expenses or a reduced number of working members). However, these variables can also positively 
affect donations if those who (or whose family) have chronic disease are more likely to appreciate 
the significance of the HEF as a program reducing the burdens of medical costs.
　The donation amount is observed only for households participating in bon phkar. Therefore, 
estimating the “amount-of-donation function” independently can entail selection bias. However, the 
estimation result of the sample selection model, in which the equation relating the decision of 
participation in bon phkar and independent variables is used as the selection function,15) indicates that 
the selection bias can be ignored.16) Therefore we estimate the amount-of-donation function 
independently by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) using only data of those participating in bon phkar. 
The number of observations is 90 after omitting samples with missing variables and one sample for 
which the donation amount is extraordinarily large (60,000 riels).
　The estimation result is presented in Table 5, which supports our hypothesis related to the effect 
of motives on the donation amount. Among the four motives, the insurance motive and “to help each 
other” have a positive sign. Particularly, the coefficient for the former is significant and its value is 
much larger than the latter. In contrast, “to help poor people” and “to make merit” have a negative 
sign. The coefficient for the former is significant.
　This result indicates that people tend to make a smaller donation in bon phkar for the HEF when 
their motive is only altruism than when they have selfish motives such as an insurance motive. In 
addition, the result that “to help each other” has a positive (though insignificant) coefficient 
suggests that we can induce more donation by making people conscious that the contribution to the 
HEF can be regarded as mutual help in their community. Some members of HEFMCs are aware of 
this possibility. The chairman of C-HEFMC told the author the following.
　　 More people would participate (in bon phkar for the HEF) if it were called “bon samakki” rather 
than emphasizing “helping poor people” because many people think that poor people are poor 
just for their lack of effort, as land was distributed equally among households in the 1980s.17)
　In his comment, samakki means unity or solidarity in Khmer. Therefore, his comment indicates 
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that, to induce people to make a donation for the HEF, it is important to make people realize that the 
contribution to the HEF is an act of helping one another in their own community, rather than 
helping poor people unilaterally out of altruism.
　Effects of some other variables are as follows. The asset size has a significant positive sign, 
indicating that donation is progressive, as is normally anticipated. In contrast, the number of 
chronically ill members is positively correlated with the donation amount, although “HH head is 
chronically ill” has a negative coefficient.18) The former result indicates that people would appreciate 
the significance of the HEF if they were to struggle with the burden of medical expenses 
themselves.
Ⅶ　Conclusion
　The pagoda-based HEF in Kirivong OD is funded by the local population, especially by donations 
from NBs. This paper presents examination of: (1) with what motives NBs contribute to the HEF; 
(2) what elements in the fundraising methods as well as the characteristics of the HEFMC induce 
their motives; and (3) the relation between the donation motives and the donation amount. Data 
collected from five HEFMCs as well as households in the catchment area of these committees 
provide the following results.
　First, reflecting the fact that they are based on vat, HEFMCs do not adopt cohesive measures to 
collect funds but solicit for voluntary donation in a way linked to vat or Buddhism such as holding a 
Table 5. Estimation result of the amount of donation function
Explanatory variables Coefficient
To help poor people (dummy) -1074.6(2.20)**
To make merit (dummy) -97.6(0.24)
To help each other (dummy) 389.1(0.89)
Insurance (dummy) 1134.3(2.22)**
Age of household head (year) 57.0(2.25)**
Education level of household heada) 639.4(1.51)
Number of household member (aged 0-14) 241.4(1.28)
Number of household member (aged 15-59) 142.4(1.08)
Number of household member (aged 60-) -819.8(1.55)
Assetb) 630.2(3.77)***
Number of cronically-ill household member  1401.8(2.60)**
Household head is cronically ill (dummy) -2062.2(2.19)**
constant -784.3(0.50)
Source: Prepared by the author.
Notes: Village dummy variables are omitted from the table.
Adjusted R2 =0.47. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Figures in the parenthese are the absolute value of t-static based on 
heterogeneity-robust standard errors.
a) No education=0; Primary school=1; Junior-highschool=2; Highschool=3.
b) See the main text and the notes for the definition of the variable.
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bon phkar and placing donation boxes at vats. The close linkage with vat also enables HEFMCs to ask 
for contributions from vats.
　Second, because of the voluntary characteristics of the fundraising and its linkage to Buddhism or 
vat, most NBs regard the contribution to the HEF as an act of merit making, to which they attach a 
great importance in their life. As a consequence, altruism for poor people and merit making based on 
it are the major donation motives for NBs.
　These two findings indicate that the fact that HEFMCs are based on vat is a key to success of the 
pagoda-based HEF not only in the sense that the members of HEFMCs can exercise proper funds 
management because of their experience of vat management, but also in the sense that their 
fundraising style motivates people without cohesion to contribute to the HEF by linking the 
contribution to religious value.
　Third, however, altruistic motives are negatively correlated with the amount of the donation each 
NB makes. Rather, NBs tend to make larger donations when they have non-altruistic motives such 
as an insurance motive or when they regard the contribution to the HEF within the context of 
reciprocity or mutual help.
　These findings provide some lessons for those who intend to raise funds at the community level 
for medical services given to poor people.
　First, where people are very religious and faith-based donation is actively organized, religious 
organizations or people selected from or linked to such organizations can be good candidates as 
fundraising organizers. In this regard, the system of the pagoda-based HEF in Kirivong OD is 
applicable to other areas of rural Cambodia. However, where the conditions described above do not 
exist, the local governmental authority would be responsible for the fundraising. What kind of 
method is effective in such a case is beyond the scope of this study and is therefore left for future 
research.
　Second, to induce non-poor people, who are asked to contribute but who cannot benefit directly 
from the scheme for poor people, to support the fundraising and increase their contribution, making 
them aware that their making a contribution can be regarded as an act of mutual support in their 
community is expected to be effective. In doing so, they can have non-altruistic motives, which are 
expected to induce a greater contribution than through altruistic motives, as described in this paper. 
Although doing this remains as a difficult question and therefore merits future research, merely 
changing the name of fundraising activities or emphasizing different points when calling for 
contributions from people might be effective, as suggested above.
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Notes
１） The health operational district (OD) is the administrative unit of health administration in Cambodia. An OD 
often includes a few districts (as a general administration unit).
２） The HEFMC also functions as the Health Center Management Committee (HCMC), but herein, we use the 
former because of our emphasis on HEF management.
３） Each HC is assigned to catchment villages: the people in these villages are supposed to use that HC. However, 
HCs can also provide medical services to people from outside their catchment area.
４） In sangkeaha of these three villages, people visit the patient's house to make a donation.
５） Cambodian local administrative units include provinces, districts, communes, and villages, in descending 
order.
６） See Jacobs and Price (2006) for the criteria and the method of identification.
７） Thngai sel is a day set aside for the observance of Buddhist precepts.
８） The donation amount in A-village shown in the table is outstanding because one household donated 60,000 
riels; if we omit this household, the average donation amount per participating household is 2,579 riels.
９） According to data collected through another survey by the author administered to 300 households in Treang 
district in 2010, which is used in Yagura (2013), 98% of respondents regarded making merit as “important” 
or “very important” to their life.
10） In the same survey, mentioned in Notes 9, 93% of the respondents answered that they could make merit by 
“helping those who are in trouble” which is comparable with “contributing to the construction of vat” (92%) 
and “making one's son become a monk” (92%).
11） To compare with the case of the HEF, we only present the figures based on data collected from NBs. In fact, 
the figures do not change much even if we include responses by EFBs in the data.
12） The distribution of the reasons for making donations in sangkeaha presented in this paper is similar to that 
presented in Yagura (2013), which is based on data mentioned in Notes 9.
13） The first component explains 52% of the total variance. The eigenvalues for respective variables are 1.55, 0.45, 
and 1.00.
14） The third variable is defined as the sum of the purchase price (in riels) of assets including tractors or tillers, 
harvesters, threshers, rice mills, water pumps, motorbikes, and automobiles. Prices denominated in US dollars 
are converted to riels with the average exchange rate of 2010 (4000 riels=1 US dollar).
15） The motive variables, which can be only defined for households participating in bon phkar, cannot be included 
in the sample selection model. Instead, to satisfy the exclusion restriction, the selection function includes two 
additional variables (a variable expressing whether the respondent has relatives among the HEF beneficiaries 
and a variable representing whether the respondent knows any HEF beneficiary in the village other than 
relatives).
16） The inverse Mill's ratio derived from the selection function is not statistically significant in the amount-of-
donation function (p=0.53).
17） Under the government of People's Republic of Kampuchea, which was established after the collapse of 
Democratic Kampuchea (the Pol Pot Regime), collective farming was dissolved gradually. Farmland was 
redistributed to rural households in the 1980s.
18） This result does not change even if we remove “HH head is chronically ill” from the equation.
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